Two interrelated key dynamics will define how Somalia evolves in 2023. The first is the scale of famine in the country. The second concerns how the Somali government and the jihadist military and political organization Al-Shabaab will respond to anti-Al-Shabaab clan uprisings. Since mid-2022, these uprisings have been supported by the new government of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, with much greater determination than that of his predecessor Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo”.
However, many of the deep political fissures that have defined Farmaajo's regime persist and will resurface in 2023. Moreover, the clan government's military operation against al-Shabaab has enormous weaknesses that could easily wipe out the campaign, while al-Shabaab remains entrenched. It is extremely premature to characterize these clan uprisings as the beginning of the end for al-Shabaab.
The devastating humanitarian crisis
At least 6.7 million SomalisNearly half of Somalia's 17.1 million people face acute food insecurity, and 300,000 people are expected to experience famine this spring. More than half a million Somali children suffer from severe malnutrition, 173,000 more than during the 2011 famine. More than a million Somalis have been internally displaced due to lack of food and water and are seeking to move to areas they can access international humanitarian supplies.
Yet the vast areas controlled by al-Shabaab receive little to no aid. One reason is that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) fear that Al-Shabaab will attack aid deliveries. The second reason is NGOs' fear of facing international legal action for material assistance to terrorist groups, as Al-Shabaab seeks to control and tax humanitarian aid. Fears that the Obama administration would pursue NGOs during the 2011 famine delayed and hampered humanitarian aid for months, likely causing tens of thousands of additional Somali deaths, before the The US government has developed legal exceptions and settings. In December 2022, the United Nations sought to allay NGO concerns by adopting resolution 2664, exempting humanitarian aid deliveries following UN sanctions.
The massive famine in Somalia, which the United Nations has not yet officially declared a 'famine' the government opposes ithas been building for a long time. Worsened by global warming, drought has been hitting Somalia for years. Five consecutive rainy seasons have failed to deliver enough water, each having an even more devastating impact on agriculture. The impacts have been multifaceted and go beyond human famine. On three million head of cattle — three-quarters of the country's total — died. Livestock is not only essential for household survival, but also constitutes an essential source of income for the Somali economy.
Clan uprisings against a backdrop of hunger
As the endless drought intensified in early summer 2022, the al-Qaeda-linked Shebab responded with typical brutality: increase taxes on local populations in a context of economic slowdown and natural disasters to compensate for loss of income, despite its large cash reserves $100 million in annual revenue. His reluctance to better calibrate tax collection to fluctuating economic conditions and his indifference to the plight of the population, including not allowing tax-free humanitarian aid during the 2011 famine, were a key reason why he lost formal control of Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia in 2011.
This time, local clan militias known as “macawisley” rebelled. Al-Shabaab responded by poisoning and destroying water wells. Undeterred, the clans did not give up: the uprisings spread and clan militias managed to wrest large parts of Hiraan, Hirshabelle and Galmudug from al-Shabaab.
The new government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud seized this opportunity and reinforced the clans with its own offensive against al-Shabaab, deploying elite Turkish-trained Gorgor forces. He also persuaded the United States to expand its anti-Shabaab cleanup operations by bringing in the Danab, an elite U.S.-trained counterterrorism force.
After six years, it was a big blow. Since 2016, no significant offensive against al-Shabaab has taken place. International forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) were crouching at their basesbeset by enormous problems. The Somali government has been distracted by dangerous tensions close to civil war between Mogadishu and the Somali Federal Member States (FMS), while the capabilities of the Somali National Army (SNA) languished horribly, despite years and millions of dollars of international training aid.
The wicked challenges of 2023
But ongoing problems will become evident in 2023.
The most immediate is the absence of holding force in the recaptured areas. The new African Union force that replaced AMISOM — the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) — provided medical evacuations, but remains largely locked by the garrison and is expected to end by 2024.
Many macaws are exhausted. Out of fear, lack of resources and inter-clan rivalries, many clans have not risen up against al-Shabaab, despite the government's urging. Meanwhile, al-Shabaab reaches out to the clans, offers deals and coerces clan elders.
Even if the SNA did not split along factional lines in the spring of 2022 as the cloud of civil war loomed between Farmaajo, opposition clans and politicians, it is still too weak to even hold territory. The most robust Gorgor and Danab — the latter having integrated US special operations forces — provide operational teeth. They do not aim to hold territory.
Frustrated by US restrictions on drone strikes in Somalia and angered by the US and international arms embargo, the Somali government reportedly began purchasing and deploy Turkish drones on the battlefield (although the Somali government denies it). But like Danab, drones do not solve the maintenance problem.
The Somali government is aware of the problem. He sought the return of 5,000 Somali troops sent to Eritrea for training during the Farmaajo years, but achieved little success due to logistical and legal challenges and diplomatic maneuvering by Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. Instead, improved relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Mogadishu have resulted in a new deal for UAE to train more than 10,000 Somali soldiers and police.
Shrouded in secrecy, the deal would eviscerate the vestiges of what is called Somali national security architecture concluded between Mogadishu, FMS and the international community in 2017. The unstable relations between Mogadishu and FMS, as well as between the main Somali clans – the dominant vector of politics and daily life – could easily become explosive. Mohamud reportedly intends to appease state presidents by proposing to delay national elections, thereby arbitrarily extending the mandate of outgoing presidents by two years. But this will not please the opposition clans and local politicians. Election delays in Somaliland, a more stable Somali region long seeking independence and not reconciled to simple FMS status, has already sparked a local crisis.
Bad governance is at the heart of Somalia's instability. The arbitrary extension of what often constitutes a rule of exclusion and impunity guarantees the persistence of such dysfunction.
Clan and political rivalries have not disappeared. As in previous Somali governments, relations between the president and prime minister, who represent different clans, remain tense, but never as bad as during the Farmaajo years.
Mohamud returned to power promising the Hawiye clans, extremely unhappy with Farmaajo's regime, to prioritize their interests – including improving security against taxes imposed by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu and Benadir. However, with the Hiraan-Hirshabelle-Galmudug offensives, Mohamud does not have enough forces to protect the center.
As expected, al-Shabaab responded to rural offensives by increasing deadly urban terrorist attacks in Mogadishu and other cities, including the deadliest attack since 2017. Besides the human horror, such attacks undermine Mohamud's security assurances to the Hawiye.
The United States would like to see another battle front opened – in southern Juba. Concerned about the porosity of its border with Somalia and long-time support of strongman President Ahmed Madobe, the Kenyan government would welcome this. But the front would trigger a complex policy between Mogadishu and Juba, particularly regarding the deployment of local and federal forces.
The type of governance that will follow in the reconquered areas is also crucial. Entrenched patterns in Somalia revolve around poor governance, inter-clan conflict and marginalization. Al-Shabaab's resilience and entrenchment comes from its ability to take advantage of corrupt governance and clan rivalries, exploit inter-clan conflicts, and offer support to marginalized clans.
Somali clan militias also have a long history of predation on local communities, generating deep resentments.
Yet planning has not been sufficient to prevent further misgovernance by militias, clan elders, politicians, and state and national government officials in the liberated areas. Avoiding major rural offensives for now, al-Shabaab is waiting for uprisings to turn bad, anticipating that new clan rivalries will provide points of re-entry.
Establishing acceptable governance and easing local tensions should become a key priority for 2023. But this will be difficult, requiring negotiation with clan elders, communities and state politicians, as well as local conflict resolution mechanisms.
Finally, there remains the big unresolved question of negotiations with al-Shabaab. The International Crisis Group I strongly requested it months ago ; the Somali government faltered; and the United States remains opposed.
But starting the dialogue does not mean reaching a final problematic agreement, as 2020 agreement with the Taliban. Instead, the start could be to negotiate humanitarian access, so that hundreds of thousands of Somalis in areas controlled by al-Shabaab do not die this year.
Al-Shabaab has frequently, but not always, rejected negotiations with the Somali government. In in early January 2023, he denied request and initiate negotiations. Formal, large-scale and visible negotiations are unlikely to begin quickly or result in a satisfactory agreement quickly. But at a minimum, NGOs and elders should not be hindered or punished for trying to negotiate humanitarian access and perhaps local agreements.
